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Abstract
Background: In the absence of other evidence, modelling has been used extensively to help policy makers plan for a
potential future influenza pandemic.
Method: We have constructed an individual based model of a small community in the developed world with detail down to
exact household structure obtained from census collection datasets and precise simulation of household demographics,
movement within the community and individual contact patterns. We modelled the spread of pandemic influenza in this
community and the effect on daily and final attack rates of four social distancing measures: school closure, increased case
isolation, workplace non-attendance and community contact reduction. We compared the modelled results of final attack
rates in the absence of any interventions and the effect of school closure as a single intervention with other published
individual based models of pandemic influenza in the developed world.
Results: We showed that published individual based models estimate similar final attack rates over a range of values for R0
in a pandemic where no interventions have been implemented; that multiple social distancing measures applied early and
continuously can be very effective in interrupting transmission of the pandemic virus for R0 values up to 2.5; and that
different conclusions reached on the simulated benefit of school closure in published models appear to result from
differences in assumptions about the timing and duration of school closure and flow-on effects on other social contacts
resulting from school closure.
Conclusion: Models of the spread and control of pandemic influenza have the potential to assist policy makers with
decisions about which control strategies to adopt. However, attention needs to be given by policy makers to the
assumptions underpinning both the models and the control strategies examined.
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Introduction
With continuing concern about the possibility of another
influenza pandemic, many models have been developed to predict
the course of the pandemic and the effect of potential intervention
strategies. Approaches to modelling the spread of infectious
respiratory diseases have included deterministic [1,2], stochastic
[3–5] and individual-based models [6–12]. These models have
ranged in focus from the whole world [1,3,4], through large [8,10]
and small [7,9] countries, to synthetic small communities [11].
However, while there are many individual-based models, no model
constructed to date has focused on a precise replication of a small
community, with detail down to individual schools, employers, and
the exact make-up of households as extracted from census datasets.
We have developed a detailed spatio-temporal model of the
Albany town and surrounding district. Albany, a relatively isolated
community of approximately 30,000 people in the south of
Western Australia, is a regional centre with one major hospital,
one technical college, 22 schools and approximately 1200
employers. We believe that this modelled population provides us
with a large enough experimental test-bed to capture the daily
mobility of individuals as found in a developed nation. Using this
model we examined the impact that social distancing measures
might have in mitigating an influenza pandemic, given that social
distancing measures can be implemented early in a pandemic by
developed and developing countries alike.
We aimed to demonstrate the development of the model and its
application to a human pandemic, with a pandemic virus
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explored social distancing measures that included school (and child
care) closure, reduced workplace attendance, reduced social and
community contact, and increased home isolation of symptomatic
individuals. These measures were examined for epidemics with
basic reproduction numbers of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. The basic
reproduction number (R0) is the average number of secondary
cases that would be infected by a single infectious individual in a
totally susceptible population, and is a measure of the transmis-
sibility of an infectious disease. Since the R0 value of a new
pandemic strain of influenza is unknown, we covered a range of R0
estimates for previous pandemics [7,8,13]. Furthermore we
compared the baseline outputs of our model and the effects of a
specific social distancing measure, school closure, with the results
from other individual-based models.
Methods
Population model construction
We constructed a geographic and demographic model of
Albany, Western Australia using a location-based connected
spatial structure [3,14–16]. Australian Bureau of Statistics Census
Collection Districts (CCD) were the finest level of spatial detail
used, with each CCD consisting of approximately 200 physically
adjacent households. Each such area was populated with a
number of households according to the 2001 census data [17]; the
constituent households each being uniquely populated with
individuals whose specific ages matched the demographics and
household age-structure of each CCD.
The model was further populated with a set of schools and
workplaces, referred to collectively as contact hubs. Data from the
state government of Western Australia were used to obtain a
comprehensive list of schools, childcare facilities, adult education
institutions (provided by the Department of Education and
Training; Frankland D, personal communication) and employers,
including the location in which they were located and their
nominal daytime population (provided by the Department of
Planning and Infrastructure; Piscicelli A, personal communica-
tion). Each child was assigned to a school or childcare centre,
presuming that children attended a school as close to their home
location as possible, and ensuring that the known age structure of
schools was maintained. Adult students and workers were assigned
to adult education institutions and workplaces respectively, with
this assignment being made with reference to census journey-to-
work information survey data for Western Australia (provided by
the Department of Planning and Infrastructure; Pradzynski J,
personal communication).
Application of the model to influenza infection
Using this population model, we conducted stochastic, individ-
ual-based spatial simulations of an influenza epidemic, assuming
that an average of one new infection per day was introduced into
the population for the duration of the simulation. Each simulation
proceeded in a sequence of 12 hour day/night cycles. During each
cycle the nominal location of each individual was decided: either
household or hub, taking into account the cycle type (i.e. day/
night, weekend/weekday), the individual’s infection status and
whether an individual needed to stay at home to supervise a child.
During each cycle, individuals occupying the same location were
deemed to come into potential infective contact when infection
transmission could occur. For larger hubs, including schools, we
assumed it was unlikely that an individual would come into close
contact with every other member of the hub during a cycle. These
larger hubs were therefore divided into fixed mixing groups, with a
maximum size of 10 individuals per group. In schools these mixing
groups consisted of same-aged children where possible; in
workplaces they were randomly assigned. The overlapping
memberships of households and hubs formed a connected social
network (see Figure 1). A study using mobile telephone location
data has shown that human movement is dominated by a
Figure 1. Idealised household and hub contact network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.g001
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assumption that individuals occupy two primary locations (a
household and a hub) is a reasonable abstraction of human
mobility in the developed world. Additional information about the
population model construction and simulation algorithm can be
found in Supplementary Information Text S1.
In addition to household and hub contact, individuals in the
simulation also engaged in random or untraceable community
contacts. This contact was assumed to be local in nature, with
contacts between individuals from the same or nearby areas being
relatively more likely than contact with individuals from distant
patches.
When an infectious and susceptible individual came into contact
during a simulation cycle, the probability that the infection was
transmitted was calculated according to a transmission function (see
below). For each contact event, an infection state (either to remain
susceptible or to become infected) for the susceptible individual
was randomly chosen via a Bernoulli trial [19]. The transmission
probability Ptrans for a contact event is a function of the states of the
infectious (Ii) and susceptible (Is) individuals involved:
Ptrans Ii, Is ðÞ ~b|inf Ii ðÞ |susc Is ðÞ
where b is the basic transmission coefficient, initially chosen to give
an epidemic with a final attack rate consistent with seasonal
influenza. To achieve simulations under a range of reproduction
numbers, b was increased from the baseline value to achieve
epidemics with target R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 (see
Supplementary Info Table S1.1). R0 was derived by inserting an
infectious individual randomly into a totally susceptible popula-
tion, counting the number of resulting secondary infections, and
averaging over 10,000 such trials. This is also the method used to
derive R0 in [7–10]; additional information may be found in
Supplementary Info Text S1.
The infectivity parameter inf(Ii) was set to 1 for symptomatic
individuals, and 0.5 for infectious but asymptomatic individuals.
The susceptibility parameter susc(Is) is a function directly
dependent on the susceptible person’s age. It captures the age-
varying susceptibility to transmission, due to both partial prior
immunity and age-related differences in contact behaviour. To
achieve a realistic age specific infection rate, the age-specific
susceptibility parameters were calibrated against the serologic
infection rates reported for H3N2 in 1977–1978 in Tecumseh,
Michigan [20] (see Supplementary Information Table S1.2). We
included in our sensitivity analyses an alternative calibration of
age-specific susceptibilities that gave rise to a flat age-specific
attack rate, similar to that of the 1968 pandemic [21] (see
Supporting Information Text S2).
Influenza infection was modelled to last 6 days: 1 day latent, 1
day asymptomatic and infectious and 4 days infectious (either
symptomatic or asymptomatic). We also assumed constant
infectivity for the infectious period, which is a simplification of
the presumed infectivity distribution found in studies of viral
shedding [21,22]. For baseline (no-intervention) epidemics with R0
values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 these timing parameters gave serial
intervals of 2.97, 2.87, 2.74 days respectively, which are consistent
with previous estimates for pandemic and seasonal influenza
[7,13,23].
Infected individuals were assumed to be immune to re-infection
for the duration of the simulation. We also assumed that influenza
symptoms developed 48 hours after infection with 20% of
infections being asymptomatic in people aged 18 years or less
and 32% being asymptomatic among older adults. These
percentages were derived by summing the age-specific antibody
titres determined in Table 5 of [24]. Symptomatic individuals were
modelled to withdraw into the home with probability 50% for
adults and 90% for children (ages 6–17).
We have used ‘‘illness attack rate’’ or ‘‘attack rate’’ to mean the
proportion of the population who experience symptomatic
infection, while ‘‘infection rate’’ refers to the proportion who
were infected with symptomatic or asymptomatic infection.
Application of the model to pandemic influenza
We assumed similar viral characteristics for pandemic influenza
as we developed for seasonal influenza, as is suggested by existing
data for H5N1 [25]. We further assumed a pandemic had been
declared in South-East Asia, that the pandemic virus was already
thought to be in Australia and that our modelled population was
aware of the likely arrival of the pandemic strain. We therefore
assumed a level of spontaneous social distancing in response to
public health announcements and news reports. Such pandemic
behaviour was assumed to contrast with that which occurs with
seasonal influenza where overall mobility and contact patterns of
asymptomatic individuals, and even some who are ill and
symptomatic, remain unaltered. Baseline parameters were chosen
to give rise to an epidemic with the following characteristics: an R0
of 1.5 giving a final illness attack rate of 34%, with 43% of
infections occurring in households, 29% in schools and workplac-
es, and 26% from community contact. Based on seasonal influenza
data [20] it has been estimated that 33%–37% of transmission
occurs in the household [8]. Given that public knowledge of a
current pandemic would induce spontaneous social distancing, we
believe it reasonable to assume a lower level of community, school
and workplace contact and a higher proportion of household
transmission (43% rather than approximately 35%).
Modelling interventions in a pandemic
We simulated four different non-pharmaceutical
intervention measures as follows. School closure. We
assumed that when schools were closed, students and teachers
spent weekday daytime cycles at home rather than at school. This
meant that no contact took place at that school hub, but that these
individuals would contact any other individuals present in their
household during the day cycle. We assumed that no additional
community contact occurred (community contact was deemed to
occur in all daytime cycles for active individuals, regardless of
whether they were present at a hub or home). We also assumed
that if school closure would result in a child being present in a
household alone, one adult from the household stayed home (and
did not make hub contacts). We assumed school closure applied to
childcare facilities, all schools, and all adult educational
institutions.
Increased case isolation. Our baseline assumption was that
upon becoming symptomatic, there was a 50% chance that an
adult, and 90% chance that a child, would withdraw to their
household for the duration of their infection (infectivity and
symptoms were deemed to cease at the same time). When the
increased case isolation intervention was in effect, this increased
house withdrawal to 90% for adults and 100% for children (ages
6–17). We assumed that withdrawn individuals made only
household contacts while withdrawn.
Workplace non-attendance. When this measure was in
effect, each person attending a (non-school) workplace hub had a
50% chance each day of staying home instead of attending the hub
(the choice was made independently each day and applied only
that day). Individuals staying at home made no hub contacts but
did contact all other individuals also at home during the day cycle.
Comparison of School Closure
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effect, it was assumed that individuals participating in community
contact during a simulation cycle made 50% of the baseline
number of effective contacts.
The degree of compliance to any intervention measure will
obviously influence the effectiveness of the measure. For our
simulations we have chosen parameters that, while severe, may be
plausible in the context of a pandemic with significant mortality.
Results of simulations examining the relationship between the
degree of compliance and the derived effectiveness of each
intervention are reported in Text S2.
Comparison with other individual based studies
We reviewed the published results from five individual based
simulation studies of the developing and developed world settings
[7–11] and compared final infection rates from these studies and
the effect of simulated school closure with the corresponding
results from our own modelling. In some cases, symptomatic attack
rates were reported; we converted these to infection rates using the
asymptomatic infection proportion used by that study.
Additional information about this aspect of the study can be
found in Supporting Information Text S1. All numerical model
parameters are listed in Supporting Information Table S1.
Results
Pandemic characteristics with no interventions
We conducted baseline simulations (assuming no intervention
measures) for epidemics with R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5 As our
simulations are stochastic in nature, the outcome of a simulated
epidemic for a fixed set of model parameters varied depending, for
example, on the choice of individuals who were ‘‘seeded’’ as
infectious index cases; the outcome of possibly infectious contact;
and the probabilistic contact behaviour of individuals. All results
were averages of 40 independent simulation runs made with
different random number seeding sequences. As we assumed a
continuous influx of infectious cases from outside the simulation
boundary at a rate of one per day, we achieve a sustained epidemic
for every simulation. Final attack rates ranged from 33% to 65%
corresponding to R0 values of 1.5 and 2.5, while peak daily attack
rates ranged from 89 to 474 cases per 10,000 (Table 1).
Modelling social distancing interventions
We simulated the effects of four different non-pharmaceutical
interventions: school closure, increased voluntary isolation of
symptomatic individuals, workplace non-attendance and reduced
community contact, with assumptions about each intervention as
described above. We simulated the optimal application timing of
the measures by assuming that the interventions were implement-
ed prior to the introduction of the first infected case and continued
indefinitely. In Table 2 we present figures capturing the
cumulative and daily attack rates determined by simulated
epidemics with (unmitigated) R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. We
also conducted a series of simulations to determine the sensitivity
of intervention measures to variation in key model parameters,
including the degree of compliance, with results presented in the
Supporting Information Text S2.
For epidemics with an unmitigated R0 of 1.5, case isolation,
school closure or community contact reduction made significant
reductions in the final attack rate, reducing it from 33% to 6%,
13% and 16% respectively. School closure combined with any of
the other interventions reduced the cumulative attack rate to
below 10%, which may be deemed to be the threshold below
which an epidemic does not occur. School closure combined with
case isolation reduced the final attack rate to 8%. For epidemics
with an R0 of 2.5, only the combination of all the modelled
intervention measures appeared capable of controlling the
epidemic, reducing the final attack rate from 65% to 3%. School
closure combined with case isolation more than halved the final
attack rate (to 30%). To achieve the large reductions in attack rates
for R0 values of 2.0 and 2.5, combinations of interventions needed
to operate for unfeasibly long periods of time (greater than 5
months).
The effect of interventions on peak daily attack rates followed a
similar pattern to that of final attack rates, although the
proportional reductions resulting from each intervention was
larger than for final attack rates.
Comparison with other studies
The characteristics of our baseline epidemics were consistent
with other simulations based on stochastic individual-based
models, specifically [7–11]. Figure 2 shows predicted final
infection rates plotted against basic reproduction number R0 for
five such models: orange (Ferguson et al 2005, Thailand) [7], light
green (Ferguson et al 2006, United Kingdom) [8], brown (Longini
et al 2005, Thailand) [9], dark green (Germann et al 2006, U.S.A.)
[10], and light blue (Glass et al 2007, a synthetic 10,000 member
community) [11]. Dark blue represents this study. The final
infection rate predicted by a simple susceptible-infected-removed
(SIR) differential equation model assuming uniform [26] is
included for comparison (red). It should be noted that Figure 2
Table 1. Simulated outcome of baseline (no-intervention) epidemics for three R0 values.
R0=1.5 R0=2.0 R0=2.5
mean (95% CI) mean (95% CI) mean (95% CI)
Final infection rate (%) 39.6 (60.5) 66.7 (60.2) 79.6 (60.1)
Final illness attack rate (%) 33.2 (60.4) 54.9 (60.2) 64.8 (60.1)
Peak symptomatic population (%) 5.3 (60.17) 17.1 (60.17) 28.3 (60.17)
Peak daily attack rate (cases per 10000) 89 (63.0) 279 (63.6) 474 (65.8)
Peak attack day 58 (62.3) 37 (61.0) 28 (60.7)
Serial interval (days) 2.97 (60.005) 2.87 (60.004) 2.74 (60.003)
Model parameters for the R0=1.5 epidemic were determined as described in the text. The fundamental transmission probability b was increased to give epidemics with
measured R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. The statistics given for each baseline epidemic are means of 40 independent randomly seeded simulation runs (95% confidence
intervals for the 40-run means are given in parentheses).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t001
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plot final infection rate against R0 for a number of individual-
based models. Our figure adds additional data points for the
Ferguson et al 2006 study [8] and includes two additional models:
the Glass et al 2007 study [11] and the study described in this
paper.
School closure was the most widely represented non-pharma-
ceutical intervention in comparable simulation studies. Three
previous studies [8,10,11] simulated school closure as a sole
intervention measure. Table 3 compares the effect of school
closure for these studies and our own. The effect of school closure
on final infection rates is shown, and for each study assumptions
about the operation of school closure are summarised.
Most models concluded that school closure would have only a
modest effect when R0 was approximately 2.0. Ferguson et al [8]
modelled school closure occurring for periods of 3 weeks triggered
by the appearance of a case within the school, and found a 4%
decrease in the infection rate (68% to 64%). The effect on the
infection rate was more dramatic in the model of Germann et al,
decreasing from 65% to 44%, but this model assumed that school
closure caused no additional increase in interpersonal contact [10].
Early and continuous school closure in the model of Glass et al
resulted in a decrease in the infection rate from 73% to 50% [11].
Our model, also assuming early and continuous school closure,
resulted in a decrease in infection rate from 67% to 55%.
Discussion
The scale of our model (approximately 30,000 individuals) is
both small enough to allow the collection of detailed information
and large enough to encompass the level at which public health
planning and response might take place.
The model of Albany was constructed using a large number of
parameters and is sensitive to the values assigned to them. We
have utilised data from studies of past pandemics, from seasonal
influenza epidemics and from related modelling work to set
parameters but some parameters remain difficult to estimate.
Sensitivity analyses, reported in Supporting Information Text S2,
suggest that the model is most sensitive to assumptions regarding
mixing group sizes in schools; the relative number of community
Table 2. Simulated final and peak daily attack rates for epidemics with non-pharmaceutical interventions.
Intervention scenario R0=1.5 R0=2.0 R0=2.5
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Final
attack
rate %
Peak daily
attack rate
(cases per 10000)
Baseline 33 89 55 279 65 474
School Closure 13 20 45 146 60 321
Case Isolation 6 9.0 30 78 49 221
Workplace Nonattendance 24 54 48 210 60 389
Community Contact Reduction 16 25 41 142. 55 291
School Closure+Case Isolation 3 4.0 8 12 30 67
School Closure+Workplace Nonattendance 61 0 3 4 8 0 5 4 2 5
School Closure+Community Contact Reduction 3 5.0 12 17 36 89
All Measures 2 3.0 2 4 3 5
Final attack rates and peak daily attack rates are given as percentages of the population, for epidemics with baseline R0 values of 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5. For each measure or
combination of measures, results are given for optimal application (pre-emptive activation and indefinite duration). All results are means of 40 independent randomly
seeded simulation runs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t002
Figure 2. Simulated final infection rates plotted against basic reproduction number R0 for a number of epidemic models, assuming
no intervention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.g002
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proportion of asymptomatic infections; and the age-specific attack
rate, specifically whether children are more susceptible to infection
than adults.
Potential impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions
We have examined the impact that non-pharmaceutical
interventions may have on the course of a pandemic in a
systematic manner, investigating a range of interventions in
isolation and in combination. Our results suggest that the rapid
activation of multiple non-pharmaceutical interventions may have
a significant effect on slowing the rate of spread and reducing the
final attack rate of an influenza pandemic in a small developed
world community. These results hold for all reproduction numbers
considered but are more effective for the lower numbers. Our
model further suggests that for R0=2.5 a local epidemic may be
prevented by the use of non-pharmaceutical measures alone,
provided that activation of measures is rapid and sustained. While
we acknowledge that the long-term enforcement of disruptive non-
pharmaceutical interventions is not socially feasible, our results
suggest that they have a key role to play, slowing the rate of growth
of the pandemic until vaccination or antiviral drugs become
available. Furthermore, many countries may not have access to a
pandemic vaccine or to antiviral drugs, and if antiviral drugs are
used a pandemic virus may rapidly become resistant [27–30],
further highlighting the importance of non-pharmaceutical
interventions.
Comparison of the baseline pandemic and the effect of
school closure simulations
Several previous studies [7–11] have used individual-based
models to simulate the spread of influenza. By comparing the
models (including our own), several conclusions can be drawn.
Final infection rates, in the absence of any interventions, are
similar in all models across a range of R0 values. This is true
despite the fact that the models were constructed from a variety of
data sources and took different approaches to building the
simulated population and its implicit contact network. For
epidemics with R0 values greater than 2.0, no single social
distancing measure is effective in preventing a local epidemic.
For R0 in the range 1.5 to 2.0, different models make quite
different predictions about the effectiveness of social distancing
measures. The most commonly modelled and clearly comparable
intervention is school closure. The effect of school closure as a sole
intervention measure shows final infection rates ranging from
1.5% to 48% for R0 in the range 1.5–1.7. Given the similarity in
modelled infection rates in the various individual based models in
the absence of interventions, the difference in the effect of school
closure appears to be related to the differences in assumptions
about the contact behaviour of pupils during periods of school
closure (an observation also made by Haber et al in [31]). For
instance, the study by Germann et al [10] assumed that no
additional contact occurred, and found school closure highly
effective at R0=1.6, with a simulated final infection rate 1.5%.
Our study (R0=1.5) assumed that additional household contact
would occur and found that school closure would be moderately
effective, reducing infection rate to 16%. The study by Ferguson et
al [8] assumed that both household and community contact would
increase and found that school closure for an R0=1.7 would only
be marginally effective. The Glass et al study [11] supports the
hypothesis that simulated school closure effectiveness is related to
assumptions about mixing. For an R0 of 1.6, a scenario where
pupils continued to contact their friends during school closure
found such closure to be marginally effective (reducing infection
rate to 41%), while a scenario in which this mixing did not occur
resulted in school closure being highly effective (final infection rate
4%).
An alternative (or compounding) explanation for the variation
in simulated effectiveness of school closure is the different
assumptions regarding the timing of its introduction. The
Ferguson et al [8] scenario, where individual schools close at the
appearance of the first symptomatic case in the school, may result
in closure occurring significantly later than the closure scenarios
used in the other studies, all of which assume that all schools in a
community close before cumulative symptomatic cases in a
community reach approximately 10 cases per 10,000.
Table 3. Summary of Simulated Effectiveness of School Closure.
Low R0 Higher R0 School Closure Assumptions
R0 IR / IR with School Closure R0 IR / IR with School Closure
Ferguson 2006 1.7 54 / 48 2.0 68 / 64 Individual schools close for 3 weeks upon
detection of case in school (schools can close
multiple times); 10% workplace closure, additional
household contact; increased household (50%)
and community (25%) contact.
Germann 2006 1.6 48 / 1.5 1.9 65 / 44 Simultaneous and continuous school closure at
10,000 (29 or 24 days) cases plus 7 days; no
additional contact.
Glass 2006 1.6 51 / 41 (4) 2.0 75 / 73 (50) 90% school closure compliance after 10
community cases. School closure infection rate
given assuming additional contact and no
additional contact in parenthesis.
Milne 2008 1.5 41 / 16 2.0 67 / 55 Schools close pre-emptively; additional household
contact; adult required to supervise children in
household.
Simulated effects of school closure on final infection rate for four individual-based influenza epidemic models. For each model results are given for moderate (R#1.7)
and severe (R$1.9) epidemics. Each model’s assumptions about the timing of the imposition of school closure and changes in mixing behaviour are summarised.
Abbreviations: IR=Infection Rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.t003
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comparison of attack rates between adults and children provided a
good indication of the likely benefits of closing schools. In our
sensitivity analysis (reported in Supporting Information Text S2)
we found that an age-specific attack rate profile similar to the 1968
pandemic (where children had much the same attack rate as other
age groups, rather than having a higher attack rate) did indeed
reduce the effectiveness of school closure. However, we also found
that altering assumptions about the size of school class mixing
groups or the amount of community contact occurring also
resulted in changes to the effectiveness of school closure, even
when age-specific attack rates were the same.
This apparent lack of consensus highlights the sensitivity of
individual-based models to the details of interpersonal contact and
individual behavioural patterns, and suggests that obtaining
reliable estimates of these parameters should be a priority. All
the models suggest that decisions on school closure options,
including when and for how long to close schools, will also have a
major effect on the final infection rate in a community.
The results of our model, and of most of the other individual
based models, are applicable to industrialised populations and may
not be applicable to developing countries with lower population
mobility and higher population densities. However, we have
shown that published individual based models of developed world
communities estimate similar final attack rates in a pandemic
where no interventions have been implemented; that multiple
social distancing measures applied early and continuously can be
very effective in interrupting transmission of the pandemic virus
for R0 values up to 2.5; and that different conclusions reached on
the simulated benefit of school closure probably result from
differences in assumptions about the timing and duration of school
closure and flow-on effects on other social contacts resulting from
school closure.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Additional model details.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s001 (0.07 MB
DOC)
Text S2 Sensitivity analysis
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s002 (0.55 MB
DOC)
Table S1 Baseline simulation parameters
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004005.s003 (0.06 MB
DOC)
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